Author: Branita

On the sideline of the national debate on the proposed new constitution, Tamil political parties have written to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, seeking an external intervention for a federal solution to the alleged grievances of Tamil people in the North and East as the final settlement and until then the demand for full implementation of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution enacted after signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement of 1987.

While top South Asian experts are of the view that India has no compulsion for 1987-like intervention in Sri Lanka now and the likely advice from New Delhi to Sri Lankan Tamil politicians would be to;‘Be more practical in your demands without clinging to redundant positions’.

President J R Jayewardene, under pressure accepted the Indian proposal and established Provincial Councils in 1987. However, the fact remains that the experience of Provincial Councils in the past 30 years demonstrated that the full constitutional extent of devolution that is possible by an innovative and flexible approach to the implementation of the 13th Amendment has not been realised. This is mainly due to unrealistic expectations of the 13th Amendment. The Provincial Councils were set up in a rush and the impractical demands such as Police and land powers could not be implemented over the years.

Recipe for disaster

In Sri Lanka, like many other resurgent Nations of the South, there are blatant attempts at political interference in policing. If the Police powers are to be devolved to provinces, there would be nine Police forces in addition to the Central Police, and experts believe, that would be a recipe for disaster.

India has 29 Police services in addition to the Central Government Police, the Reserve Police and few other central law enforcement bodies. As most of the Indian states are bigger than Sri Lanka, it is not possible for a single Central Police Force to maintain law and order, thus there is every justification for the establishment of State Police services. Therefore, each of the 29 States have their own Police forces. The Centre is also allowed to maintain its own Police forces to assist the states with ensuring law and order. It maintains seven central Police forces and some other Police organisations for specialised tasks such as intelligence gathering, investigation, research and record-keeping, and training.

The primary role of Police forces is to uphold and enforce laws, investigate crimes and ensure security for people in the country. In a large and populous country like India, Police forces need to be well-equipped, in terms of personnel, weaponry, forensic, communication and transport support, to perform their role well.

However, the clear cut demarcation of state and central Police functions, could not prevent serious disputes between the State Police and the Indian Central Police. The most recent issue was the breach in security of Prime Minister Narendra Modi during his visit to Punjab on 5 January.With farmer protesters blocking the road, the PM’s cavalcade was stranded on a flyover in Hussainiwala in Punjab. Calling it “a major lapse in the security of the PM”, the Ministry of Home Affairs had sought a report from the Punjab Government and asked it “to fix responsibility for this lapse and take strict action”.

Centre to take action

Indian Media reported that the Centre is considering action under the Special Protection Group Act against Punjab Police officers following the security breach. Even as the Punjab Government has constituted a high-level committee to probe the incident, sources said the Centre is preparing to take action against erring officials under provisions of the SPG Act. This, they said, could entail summoning the Punjab Police officers responsible to Delhi or instituting a central-level inquiry against them. “What happened on Wednesday in Punjab is a violation of the SPG Act as the State Government failed to follow all protocols set by the SPG for the PM’s movement. Things are being worked out. Action will be taken,” a Government official told Media.

Section 14 of the SPG Act makes the State Government responsible for providing all assistance to the SPG during the PM’s movement.

The provision, titled ‘Assistance to Group’, states: “It shall be the duty of every Ministry and Department of the Central Government or the State Government or the Union Territory Administration, every Indian Mission, every local or other authority or every civil or military authority to act in aid of the Director or any member of the Group whenever called upon to do so in furtherance of the duties and responsibilities assigned to such Director or member.”

If there are nine provincial Police forces in Sri Lanka, one could imagine the chaos in such a situation involving a VVIP travelling from one province to another.

There was another recent instance of a clash between Indian Central Police and State Police of West Bengal. Last year, when a convoy of BJP president

J P Nadda was attacked allegedly by Trinamool workers during a political rally in West Bengal, the Centre had called three IPS officers, who were in charge of Nadda’s security, on central deputation to Delhi. The MHA had then directed West Bengal Police officers to report to Delhi for a deputation with the Government of India. The three officers, however, were not released by the State Government and did not join central deputation as demanded by the MHA.

Devolving Police powers

The MHA had then also sought a report from the Chief Secretary and the DGP of the state and even summoned them to Delhi for a meeting. The state, however, did not send a report and the two officers excused themselves from the meeting on the ground that the State Government was already probing the matter. The developments had precipitated a war of words between the Trinamool and the BJP, with the former calling MHA “vindictive”.

If the Police powers were devolved to provinces in Sri Lanka, there could be major rifts between the central Police and provincial Police, especially during National Elections when opposition parties are in power in a province. In such an event it could lead to even communal clashes if the minority parties holding power in a province attempt to defend the errant provincial Police officers or vice versa.

In India, the opposition parties in the States demand probes by central agencies even on trivial issues and the party in power in the State interprets such demands as one that infringes upon the constitutional rights of the states. When both sides move court, it becomes difficult for the courts of law to decide and it could lead to a serious impasse.

There is a justification for the demand for Tamil speaking Policemen and women for Police stations in the north and east. However, establishing an armed separate Police forces for the provinces could create a security nightmare instead of solving the issue of maintenance of law and order. It is for the constitution drafting bodies to ensure a safe mechanism without rushing through a draft similar to 13th Amendment, which created more problems than finding answers.

The dollar-starved Sri Lankan government is buoyed that it has been receiving financial assistance from India and China, which are vying for the dominance of the South Asian part of the Indo-Pacific region.

In recent weeks, regular announcements that the country has received currency swaps and credit lines from both these countries indicate, on the one hand, a temporary equilibrium or truce in the Indo-China power rivalry over Sri Lanka and, on the other, a foreign policy course correction by the Gotabaya Rajapaksa government.

It was not for nothing that President Rajapaksa in his policy statement on Tuesday included a short paragraph with a geopolitical undertone. It said: “We are a free sovereign nation. We have no need to intervene in conflicts among powerful nations. While we respect our neighbours, we wish to pursue a policy of friendship with all States.”

Such a declaration of neutrality was also found in the President’s inauguration speech in November 2019. But in practice there had been an apparent tilt towards Beijing in the government’s policy, much to the chagrin of New Delhi until the pandemic and the fast depleting foreign currency reserves brought upon the realization that it would be in Sri Lanka’s interest to always maintain foreign policy neutrality vis-à-vis the regional power conflict between India and China.

The apparent course correction is bringing in some early returns, with India and China coming forward to help Sri Lanka to tide over what could be its worst economic crisis in its 74-year post-independence existence. However, to think that such assistance is not conditions-attached is political naivety. Beijing’s assistance, especially in the afterglow of its foreign minister’s visit to Sri Lanka and similar help from New Delhi after Sri Lanka’s finance minister’s political angioplasty in the artery to the heart of India give the impression that the two Asian powers have decided to put up with Sri Lanka’s fresh equidistant policy assurance.

In the horn of Africa, strategically placed port nation of Djibouti has gone to the extreme with its equidistant foreign policy. The country of one million people with a US$ 3billion GDP, which is equivalent to China’s GDP for two hours, has allowed China’s People’s Liberation Army to set up its first overseas military base—and that, too, just 10 kilometres away from a US military base. The country also houses French, German, British, Italian, Spanish Saudi Arabian military facilities. Russia and India are also seeking a military presence in the country that overlooks one of the world’s busiest sea lanes — the Bab al Mandeb chokepoint that connects Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden.

Sri Lanka need not and, we hope, will not go to the extent of emulating Djibouti to swell its foreign reserves. The country’s equidistant big-power policy should remain demilitarised without ambiguity. This is a difficult task for the government, given the big powers’ ability to turn their demilitarised presence into militarised presence if the need arises. Greece, for instance, despite being a Nato member, is compelled to permit visits by China’s naval vessels to its ports developed with Chinese financial assistance.

Unlike the Cold War conflict which saw rival powers not only severing diplomatic ties but also economic ties, the present day subterranean cold war, which is also referred to as hybrid warfare, allows trade relations between hostile powers to flourish even as military hostilities escalate amid mutual suspicion, sabotage of rival nation’s geostrategic projects and influence buying with neighbours.

A textbook case of this hybrid warfare is Sino-India relations. While the COVID pandemic was raging across the world in mid-2020 and India was struggling to cope with it, Chinese troops crossed the Line of Actual Control and captured 1000 square kilometers in eastern Ladakh. About 20 Indian soldiers died in the unexpected attack. In the northern most Indian state of Sikkim, a tense situation arose following Chinese military incursions in January and May last year. While Beijng was testing India’s resolve to take on China militarily, the two countries are also focused on undermining each other’s geostrategic footholds in neighbouring nations. This was while trade between India and China reached a record $125 billion in 2021.
Perhaps with the exception of Pakistan, every South Asian nation has caught up in the Sino-India hybrid war. Take for instance, the case of the Maldives.

China’s foreign minister Wang Yi, ahead of his recent visit to Colombo, was in the Maldives, a country which under President Ibrahim Solih, has embraced an India-first policy to amend relations that remained strained during the presidency of pro-China Abdulla Yameen. But of late, President Solih has been seen adopting an equidistant foreign policy vis-à-vis China and India. Last year, the capital, Male, also saw a series of public protests against India’s alleged military presence in the archipelago. The government said the protests were the handiwork of Yameen supporters, who deliberately misinterpreted the positioning of a few emergency-response Indian helicopters in a Maldivian atoll as unsolicited Indian military presence. However, in small countries like Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Nepal, it is strongly suspected that rival big powers play a behind-the-scenes role in instigating public protests and getting involved in regime change ops.

Writing for the Indo-Pacific Defence Forum magazine, Sarosh Bana, executive editor of Business India, says India must continue to counter China’s attempts to buy influence with its neighbours.

In addition to offering neighbours economic and military alternatives to China’s One-Belt-One-Road enticements, India should look to the Quad, he said, adding that together, the Quad nations – India, the United States, Japan and Australia — could create an infrastructure fund that provides financially sustainable alternatives to China’s debt-trap projects for India’s neighbours.

But China rejects allegations that it is setting debt traps for developing nations with predatory loans often extended to financially unsustainable infrastructure projects with the intention of taking over the facilities after defaults on repayments.

China also vehemently rejects recent reports that it is planning to take over the Entebbe airport after the Ugandan government had defaulted repayments of the loan it obtained from China’s Exim Bank. But the Wall Street Journal which first published the story and Ugandan opposition figures say the terms of the takeover are in the fine print of the US$200 million agreement, which was not revealed to the public by the Ugandan government.

Whether the allegations are credible or not, loan-obtaining small countries should be mindful that there is always a hidden price attached even in free aid, for there is no free lunch in international politics. Whether this price is worth paying for is a matter to be prudently assessed by policy makers and advisers.

Sri Lanka should be prudent enough to balance its short-term and long-term national interest with the national interest of those big powers which seek to increase their strategic foothold in Sri Lanka by offering assistance Sri Lanka desperately needs.