Briefing newsmen on President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s New Delhi visit in Colombo, Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath made a startling commitment of sorts. He conceded that they did not discuss the ethnic issue, implying a political solution, hence the subject did not find a mention in the Joint Statement issued at the conclusion of a hugely successful visit.
Minister Herath had reasons and justifications why they did not discuss a political solution to the vexatious issue, which has become a customary subject for bilateral discussion at all levels, and thus also of joint statements, against at whatever level. According to him, the Thirteenth Amendment was already a part of the (Sri Lankan) Constitution, and there was nothing more to discuss in the matter.
As is known, 13-A facilitated by India through the instrumentality of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, both of 1987 vintage, provides for power-devolution to (nine) Provinces created under the accompanying Provincial Council Act (PCA), also of the same year. India went beyond facilitation, unlike in the case of the earlier Thimphu Talks, and LTTE-slain Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi signed the Accord with late President J R Jayewardene, the author and architect of 13-A and the PCA.
Today, when the incumbent Foreign Minister declares that there was nothing to discuss beyond 13-A, does he imply that the Dissanayake-led NPP government was ready to implement all provisions of the Amendment, as originally passed? If so, will the Government restore powers that were originally conferred to the Provinces under 13-A, in Education and Health sectors but were withdrawn one after the other, in the name of creating ‘National Schools’ and ‘National Hospitals’?
More importantly, will the Dissanayake Government implement 13-A provisions on Police and Land Powers for the Provinces, which were not considered for implementation by successive Governments in the past? Or, is it that Dissanayake and Herath were only indicating that it’s only thus far and no more – and that there was no question of the Colombo Government conceding ‘federalism’, as sought by almost every other Tamil party ahead of the twin polls?
By implication it also meant that ‘federalism’ was not a part of 13-A, and that being the case, India had no role to play. Even without it, the Tamil parties have been shifting from one position to the other and back to the former, over the past several years. Barring Gajendra Kumar Ponnambalam, other Tamil leaders and their parties had penned a common missive to PM Modi not very long ago, asking New Delhi to pressure Colombo (then under President Wickremesinghe) to concede 13-A wholesale – with no reference whatsoever to ‘federalism’, their hobby-horse, off again, on again.
Contrived charade
Incidentally, whenever the 13-A question had arisen after the LTTE had launched fresh offensives, post-Accord, and whenever the Government of the day had commenced fresh negotiations with the same set of Tamil leaders since then, the former invariably ended up talking about a new Constitution, wherein they either implied that the agreed points would be incorporated in the existing Constitution or a brand new Constitution would be put forth, after discussing the pending proposals with other stake-holders, too.
It applies equally to the holier-than-thou ‘Chandrika Package I & II’, the latter being a wanton dilution of what was originally agreed upon with the combined Tamil leadership. The general belief was that changes were required between I and II, to win over the Sinhala South, where not only ‘Buddhist-nationalist majoritarians’ but also the political Opposition would not help to obtain a two-thirds majority in Parliament.
Looking back, it has to be readily conceded that the Chandrika Packages were as much a ploy as those that followed to deny the Tamils their due – or, what was accepted by the government of the day. There are dispassionate reasons now to believe that President Chandrika Bandaranaike-Kumaratunga, CBK, combined the ‘ethnic package’ with her proposal for advancing the presidential polls, with a clear knowledge that the Opposition UNP would reject it wholesale. That would not have been possible if the Package and the presidential term/poll Bill had been de-linked and put to separate votes in Parliament.
In doing so, now-disintegrated SLFP’s CBK was more than helpful to the equally forgotten UNP and its continually discredited ‘Leader’, Ranil Wickremesinghe, then the Leader of the Opposition in Parliament. Imagine a situation in which the CBK government had de-linked the two Bills and forced the UNP to take a stand on the ‘ethnic package’? Ranil and the UNP would have been cornered, and he would have also lost the opportunity to dramatize their rejection of the combo Bill by burning it within the Parliament’s Chamber.
In sum, it was a politico-constitutional sacrilege that had been well thought out in advance. Thankfully it has not been repeated or replaced by a worse sin of the kind. Yet, the fact remains, the ‘Chandrika Package’ has remained the most contrived charade of the kind that looked more convincing than even the 13-A, which, as it turned out not one of JRJ’s successors, was keen on implementing – full, half or quarter.
That includes the JVP-initiated legal proceedings, at the end of which the Supreme Court de-merged the Northern and Eastern Provinces, which was a bedrock of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. Needless to say when Minister Herath talks about 13-A in all seriousness or innocence or both, he is also implying a de-linked North and East. Then and now, it is another matter, keeping the North and East together as a single provincial unit was/is impractical, unconvincing and artificial.
It is another matter that then or now, such a course would not have won an exclusive referendum in the East, as provided in the Provincial Council Act. Such a course implied that the East was merging – or, being merged — with the North and not the two of them were merging on their own volition.
Tipping point
Truth be acknowledged, the closest that the two sides came to being able to implement a new package acceptable to the Tamils especially was when the post-war Mahinda Rajapaksa government initiated political negotiations with the TNA. The negotiations did progress though there were inherent impediments, including the question of re-merger of the North and the East. The expectation was that the TNA would not be unwilling to accept the ground reality if only they got a face-saving commitment on Police and Land Powers.
The two sides did come to a general agreement on Land Powers, according to reports. They were also not travelling away from a loose consensus on Police Powers, though from time to time, the government negotiators might have been perplexed by the contra indications that came to them from the top, between one session and the next. Yet, neither side had lost hope.
The tipping-point came about when M A Sumanthiran, then a upcoming post-war leader introduced to the TNA and the nation, went to town about the ongoing US-led UNHRC process ahead of the maiden bid in March 2012. Sumanthiran claimed, rather owned up, the TNA’s pressure on the US as the main reason for the initiation of the UNHRC process after Sri Lanka had countered a pending post-war draft resolution with a supportive counter from, yes, India and China, otherwise adversaries.
Whoever had thought out the strategy, especially of making the TNA mouth public support for the US-led process, had obviously concluded that any governmental indication in that first year that it was up to putting the ‘brave soldiers’ up for a ‘Nuremberg-like’ trial, won the day. Subconsciously, every Sri Lanka stake-holder had recent memories not only of Mullivaikkal but also the ‘Saddam Hussein trial and execution’ running in his mind. The contradictory messages from both were confusingly confounding, causing the political talks to end abruptly.
No-brainer, yet…
Today, after the JVP-NPP won the highest number of votes in the key Jaffna electoral district and bagged the highest number of three of six parliamentary seats from the district, and also fared even better elsewhere across the Tamil land in the North and the East, there isn’t much that the Tamil parties and their leaders could crow about, as their achievements from the past. As if on cue, even as the results were pouring in, each and every one of them, rather than discussing or debating their collective failure as the broken conscience of their Tamil people, began talking about ‘Tamil nationalism’, political solution – and now back to ‘accountability issues’.
This is a no-brainer, and they all know it all the same. Their immediate task, as is the case with the JVP-NPP at the national-level, is to consolidate their collective electoral positions in the Tamil areas, through the local government polls, which AKD has now promised before the twin Sinhala-Tamil New Year, in mid-April, followed by the even more delayed Provincial Council polls later next year. For them to try and resurrect their fallen image and vote-shares, they need to revive the ‘Tamil nationalist’ cause, which has failed them all in the parliamentary poll more visibly than in the presidential election.
But will it work? And will the Tamil parties and leaders come together, as initiated by Gajan Ponnambalam, now after the parliamentary election? More importantly, does the present leadership of the multiple Tamil outfits, both political and social, ready to step aside for good and hand over the torch to the younger generation? They are either old, discredited, or both.
They are not going to do it, and they are unlikely to woo back those voters that had gone the NPP way in the parliamentary election. Which means, whether it is 13-A or not — it certainly is not going to be federalism – a political package, new or revival of the old, would depend entirely on the NPP’s performance in the twin polls in the New Year. If they sweep both as with the parliamentary election, they would feel more confident than already.
They can decide and also convince the southern Sinhala nationalist constituency on whatever they decide – 13-A, plus or minus, or none. Only post-war Mahinda leadership could have sold that kind of package to the southern Sinhala constituency.
Conversely, if the NPP fails to fare well in either or both polls, and in relative terms, they would have to fall back on their traditional Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist constituency. Rather, they cannot afford to risk anything…
And thereby hangs a tale!
(The writer is a Chennai-based Policy Analyst & Political Commentator. Email: sathiyam54@nsathiyamoorthy.com)
